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A copyright system reflects struggles to define the relationship between competing values. This 
competition not only manifests itself in copyright law, but also (and increasingly) in copyright technology. 
Technologies embody contestable social values; values that can be reshaped when deployed in a social 
context. Copyright technology is no exception and, thus, we experience efforts to reshape the copyright 
system (and the values within it) by affecting the technological landscape in which it is located (in what I 
refer to as technopolitics). Contemporary claims for a right to hack are but one manifestation of these 
processes but, as I will argue, an insufficient one at best. Realizing the limits of a right to hack thrusts our 




Some say copyright law is irrelevant in a digitally-networked environment 
because cheap, nearly perfect quality, reproduction and distribution of digital works make 
copyright enforcement pointless. Others hold the opposite: if copyright law seems less 
relevant today it’s because enforcement of copyright interests through technological 
means is commonplace, displacing conventional legal mechanisms. Both are partially 
true; the second is mainly a reaction to the first, although incomplete in its claim that 
technology completely displaces law. After all, technological enforcement of copyright 
interests operates with explicit legal encouragement and sometimes in the shadow of 
legal entitlements or conditioned by incentive structures provided by law. Be that as it 
may, the fact is that copyright law is enforced through technology and, when it is, we 
experience the effects of political values embodied in these technologies and in their 
deployment. When this happens, it often affects free speech values. 
“Do artifacts have politics?”, Langdon Winner famously asked.1   Exactly in what 
way do they “have” them, what is the relationship between human values and 
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technological artifacts?  In a way the technological is political: design (as well as law, 
markets, social norms, power relations) may define who says what, when, and through 
which means.2 Yet, it would be simplistic to say that designers inscribe values into 
technologies, which we somehow later receive intact.  Technologies, information 
technologies no less, acquire social meaning throughout their development, deployment 
and use. Political, economic, cultural elements might help establish them as tools for 
freedom, control, sharing, community, piracy or whatever; beyond designers’ 
prescriptions. In these processes, significantly, users are crucial: as technologies are 
appropriated, reinterpreted and re-inscribed by them. As soon as a technology is deployed 
in a social context its normativity is susceptible to reconfiguration; its values redefined 
(particularly highly malleable digital technology). This give-and-take of inscription, 
appropriation and resignification is a sort of “technological drama”3 often missed when 
considering the practical conditions for freedom of expression. 
During the past two decades or so, legal academics have tried to elucidate the 
place of the user in these dynamics.  Some think about them in terms of “user 
innovation”.4 Sometimes user activity is described as “hacking” or “tinkering”, while 
legal instruments worldwide prohibit “circumvention” of “effective technological 
measures” (or Digital Rights Management systems (DRM): technological locks designed 
to limit the use of copyrighted works in digital formats.   
                                                                                                                                                 
1 Langdon Winner, Do Artifacts Have Politics? 109 DAEDALUS 121 (1980). 
2 LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE: AND OTHER LAWS OF CYBERSPACE, VERSION 2.0 (2006). 
3 Bryan Pfaffenberger, Technological Dramas, 17 SCIENCE, TECHNOLOGY, & HUMAN VALUES 282 (1992). 
4 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005); William Fisher III, The Implications for Law of 
User Innovation, 94 MINN L REV 1417 (2010).  
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DRM-laden environments were a consequence of the disruptive effects of 
networked information technologies on established information flows,5 preventing people 
from using works to the full extent allowed by traditional copyright liberties.6   As a 
result, the 1990’s gave rise to claims for a “right to hack”7 DRM technologies.  In the 
United States, this “right to hack” is sometimes supported by the idea that “code is 
speech” and, thus, code writing seen as covered by the constitutional free speech 
guarantee. If, like law, technology is a social structure that helps shape social reality, it 
may be that particular technological arrangements affect or constitutes the environment 
for expressive activity. Thus, it might be that claims for an individual “right to hack” (to 
manipulate or reconstitute technology) have to do with demands to define the conditions 
for freedom of expression.  
That was roughly the discussion in the 1990’s; yet, today, the idea of a right to 
hack seems increasingly relevant in light of current tendencies toward internet closure.8 
Part of this closure occurs through a decrease in what Jonathan Zittrain calls “generative 
technologies”: technologies, such as the internet and the general purpose PC, that have 
the “capacity to produce unanticipated change through unfiltered contributions from 
broad and varied sources”.9  In turn, we see a gradual, global, move towards non-
generativity in the internet ecology so that the online expressive environment 
increasingly depends on “tethered”—always on, always connected—appliances (like 
                                                 
5 YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS (2006). 
6 By which I mean, following Litman, “[r]eading, listening, viewing, and their modern cousins watching, 
playing, running, and building”, Jessica Litman, Lawful Personal Use, 85 TEXAS L. REV. 1871, 1893 
(2007). 
7 Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in Cyberspace, 
28 CONN. L. REV. 981 (1996); Julie Cohen, The Jurisprudence of Self Help, 13 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 1089 
(1998).  
8 Of which “net neutrality” debates are a large component. See BARBARA VAN SCHEWICK, INTERNET 
ARCHITECTURE AND INNOVATION (2010). 
9 JONATHAN ZITTRAIN, THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET—AND HOW TO STOP IT 70 (2008). 
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mobile phones and tablets, TV home systems, eBook readers, etc) that limit unanticipated 
creativity and innovation.  
Because many devices through which we access digital goods are networked and 
are capable of “phoning home” or being contacted by a central command for amendment, 
upgrades or redesign, user behavior generally (and copyright use in particular) is, 
therefore, regulable at a distance.10   It is in this context where the “right to hack” rears its 
head today (fashionably known as “jailbreaking”)11 suggesting something beyond 
singular DRM circumvention and “lock breaking” and, more connected to liberating 
users from the constraining effects of non-generative socio-technical systems. 
However, both copyright and constitutional law have fundamental structural 
limitations that prevent us from experiencing a constitutional right to hack.  Likewise, 
because current mechanisms for enforcing copyright interests technologically have 
critical components that lie beyond users’ reach, a right to hack is generally useless (as a 
mater of practicality). For these reasons (structural limits in legal enactments and in 
                                                 
10 A recent controversy presents an example: when designing an e-book reader, a developer might consider 
whether to incorporate a “read-aloud” function. When Amazon included such feature in its Kindle 2, the 
Author’s Guild claimed that the read-aloud function infringes their copyrights.  Over the Author’s Guild’s 
objection, the National Federation of the Blind argued that to read a book to another (by a human or 
machine) is a legally (and one might add, constitutionally) protected practice. Although Amazon initially 
defended the function as non-infringing, in then end it capitulated allowing each publisher to control 
whether to allow the read-aloud function to work on particular books.  In the end, not only is the innovation 
hampered; people that need it the most will not receive its benefits and the creativity and expression that 
goes with it might be lost. See Geoffrey A. Fowler & Jeffrey A. Trachtenberg, New Kindle Audio Feature 
Causes a Stir, Washington Post, Feb. 10, 2009,  
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB123419309890963869.html?mod=yahoo_hs&ru=yahoo; NFB, National 
Federation of the Blind Responds to Authors Guild Statement on the Amazon Kindle 2, Feb. 12, 2009, 
http://www.nfb.org/nfb/NewsBot.asp?MODE=VIEW&ID=412&SnID=1916786125; Greg Sandoval, 
Amazon retreats on Kindle's text-to-speech issue, Feb. 27 2009, http://news.cnet.com/amazon-retreats-on-
kindles-text-to-speech-issue/.  
11 Recently the Library of Congress allowed, as an exception to the DMCA, jailbreaking of phones for 
interoperability, allowing “Computer programs that enable wireless telephone handsets to execute software 
applications, where circumvention is accomplished for the sole purpose of enabling interoperability of such 
applications, when they have been lawfully obtained, with computer programs on the telephone handset.” 
Federal Register/Vol. 75, No. 143/Tuesday, July 27, 2010. See Electronic Frontier Foundation, EFF Wins 
New Legal Protections for Video Artists, Cell Phone Jailbreakers, and Unlockers, 
https://www.eff.org/press/archives/2010/07/26, July 27, 2010. 
Meléndez-Juarbe   
 5
constitutional theory, as well as practical limitations imposed by the technological 
system), our efforts to recalibrate the balance between political values embedded in 
copyright law must transcend the very same constitutional principles that could be said to 
support a right to hack. In turn, we must devote our energies to the broader socio-tecnical 
systems in which copyright law and technologies inhabit.   
The article’s argument can be summarized as follows: It cannot be said that a 
copyright system (in law and/or technology) neatly embodies a single set of values. In 
turn, it reflects struggles to define the relationship between competing social 
commitments. This competition not only manifests itself in copyright law, but also (and 
increasingly) in copyright technology.  In this sense, technologies embody contestable 
social values; values that can be reshaped when deployed in a social context. Copyright 
technology is no exception and, thus, we experience efforts to reshape the copyright 
system (and the values within it) by affecting the technological landscape in which it is 
located (in what I refer to as technopolitics). Claims for a right to hack are but one 
manifestation of these technopolitical processes but, as I will argue, an insufficient one at 
best. Realizing the limits of a right to hack thrusts our technopolitics into broader socio-
technical arrangements and in the process we experience the limits of constitutional and 
copyright law to deal with pressing freedom of speech problems.  
I.  Copyright Systems: Law and Technology 
 Implicit in the Introduction is the idea that a copyright system is comprised of 
more than legal enactments: it includes the relationship between law and the relevant 
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technologies (and the affordances and constraints provided by these technologies).12  
Thus, copyright law and copyright technology jointly constitute a complex copyright 
system, striking balances and managing competing pressures that help shape the 
expressive environment. Our exploration begins by identifying some of the social values 
at play in a copyright system, in its legal and technological dimensions.  Thus we will see 
the relation between diverse, and divergent, values embedded in this socio-technical 
system. I explore first copyright law, then copyright technology. 
A. Law 
In the United States (and I am tempted to say, almost elsewhere), copyright law is 
inherently unstable. Copyright law is a system of values, and not about pursuing a single 
goal. At any given point its shape will depend on the interaction between constantly-
competing domains of value that exert pressure against one another. These correspond, 
respectively, to three paradigms or copyright worldviews: incentives, property and 
speech.   How we define each of these paradigms as well as their interactions will impact 
how individuals should relate with content and, thus, shape an important aspect of the 
expressive environment. I cannot elaborate these themes here in depth; but some 
precisions are appropriate.  
According to one justification, copyright aims to maximize social welfare by 
providing sufficient incentives to information producers, preventing free riding. But, 
because innovation is cumulative, information is both an output and an input of the 
creative process.  Thus, information products have a social value that exceeds the private 
value to the first creator and the scope and duration of copyright law depends on how 
                                                 
12 DONALD NORMAN, THE DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS (2002). The term “affordance” refers to “the 
perceived and actual properties of the thing, primarily those fundamental properties that determine just how 
the thing could possibly be used,” id. at 9, while “constraints limit the number of alternatives” Id. at 82.  
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much these innovation spillovers are believed to aid follow-on creators. IP rights will 
depend on how to balance incentives to initial creators with the innovation’s social 
benefit; and hence, the biggest challenge with privatization of intellectual resources 
resides in insuring the production of this public good, while limiting the property right 
enough to prevent underutilization. In this story, the individual is pictured as choosing 
between utility maximizing action possibilities. Of course, authors on many occasions 
create for reasons other than economic rewards and follow creative pursuits for reasons 
such as a desire to communicate, peer respect and recognition.13 The incentive rationale, 
and its accompanying idea of the creator, is challenged by the fact of peer-production in a 
networked information economy or the many cases of user-generated innovation studied 
by von Hippel.14 But the incentives paradigm is incredibly resilient and, accordingly, the 
US Supreme Court conceives the copyright system as such: “[b]y establishing a 
marketable right to the use of one’s expression, copyright supplies the economic 
incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”15 By and large this paradigm operates ex-ante, 
providing incentives as a precondition to innovation, and could justify minimal copyright 
protections only to the extent necessary to induce production, but could (and often does) 
underlie maximalist “ex-post”16 justifications for strong protection such as limited fair 
                                                 
13 Zimmerman, Diane Leenheer, Copyrights as Incentives: Did We Just Imagine That? (November 30, 
2009). Theoretical Inquiries in Law, Forthcoming. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1515964 
14 ERIC VON HIPPEL, DEMOCRATIZING INNOVATION (2005).  Others, without challenging this image of what 
motivates innovation, question instead whether the intellectual property monopoly is welfare enhancing. 
MICHELLE BOLDRIN & DAVD K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) 
15 Eldred v. Aschcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003)  
16 Mark Lemley, Ex Ante versus Ex Post Justifications for Intellectual Property, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 129 
(2004). It is argued that only strong intellectual property rights give the first creator efficient incentives to 
innovate and improve over an existing work over time since they are adequately positioned to perceive 
market signals over initial instantiations of the work and that strong protection prevents overuse, avoiding a 
decrease in the value of intellectual property rights. See e.g. Randall Picker, Fair Use v. Fair Access, at 16 
John M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper No. 392 (2d Series, 2008), available at, 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1104764 (arguing that the initial author is in a better 
position to “take advantage of the information that we know will be forthcoming to make the second-stage 
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use privileges or indefinite term extension.17 The extent to which the ex post version can 
be kept at bay depends on how incentives interacts with property and speech.   
 When I refer to the property paradigm, I mean its moral dimension: since it is 
easy to move from an instrumentalist perspective to a view of moral desert. “The thought 
moves from encouragement, to incentive, to benefit, to reward, to desert, so that 
something that starts off as a matter of desirable social policy ends up entrenched in an 
image of moral entitlement.”18 This normative property paradigm takes several forms.  
On one view, intellectual property is justified as a matter of moral desert, valuing the 
mixture of individual labor with common resources.19 In addition, the property paradigm 
is embodied in property personality justifications that support author moral rights in most 
countries.20 Although US courts pay lip service to the incentives rationale, the moral 
desert paradigm takes a strong hold on popular imagination and legal discourse. In the 
words of a federal judge: “‘Thou shalt not steal’…The conduct of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
investment decision”). WILLIAM LANDES & RICHARD POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 222 (Harvard 2003) (discussing congestion externalities that they argue are 
applicable to copyright law) “One purpose of giving the owner of a copyright a monopoly of derivative 
works is to facilitate the scope and timing of the exploitation of the copyrighted work—to avoid, as it were, 
the ‘congestion’ that would result if once the work was published anyone could make and sell translations, 
abridgements, burlesques, sequels, versions in other media from that of the original … or other variants 
without the copyright owner’s authorization.” Id. at 226.  
17 Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003); Richard Epstein, The Disintegration of Intellectual Property? A 
Classical Liberal Response to a Premature Obituary, SSRN eLibrary (2008), at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1236273; Epstein, Richard A., What is So Special 
about Intangible Property? The Case for Intelligent Carryovers (August 16, 2010). U of Chicago Law & 
Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 524. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1659999 
18 Jeremy Waldron, From Authors to Copiers: Individual Rights and Social Values in Intellectual Property, 
68 CHI. KENT. L. REV. 841, 851  (1993). 
19 See Wendy Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law 
of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993). See also Daniel Attas, Lockean Justifications of 
Intellectual Properties in, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THEORIES OF JUSTICE at 29 (Axel Gosseries, 
Alain Marciano and Alain Strowel, Eds. 2008). 
20 See Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287 (1988). With regards to 
moral rights in general see, Cyrill P. Rigamonti, Deconstructing Moral Rights, 47 HARV. INT’L. L. J 353 
(2006). In the United States see Visual Artists Rights Act of 1990, codified in 17 USC §§ 101, 106A. For 
some supporting views of moral rights in the United States, see Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Inspiration and 
Innovation: The Intrinsic Dimension of the Artistic Soul, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1945, 1983-2012 (2006).  
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defendants…violates not only the Seventh Commandment, but also the copyright laws of 
this country.”21 In the process, unauthorized use acquires a decisive moral complexion.22  
As Waldron put it, “[i]f we think of an author as having a natural right to profit from his 
work, then we will think of the copier as some sort of thief”.23 Portrayal of the author as a 
property owner, not only in the law and in legal discourse but also as a general social 
understanding, reinforces the property paradigm either independently or as it gets fed into 
the welfarist incentives account in its strong, ex post, version. This is especially true 
when the entertainment industry pursues aggressive “educational” campaigns to portray 
all unauthorized copying as illegal and, hence, all who engage in that practice as 
thieves.24 The idea is to “invest unauthorized private copying with moral significance.”25  
The speech paradigm is sometimes seen as part of the incentives paradigm as 
limitations on speech via the copyright monopoly are justified to the extent it creates 
conditions for creative and expressive processes: a sort of expression maximization.26 
Sometimes an author’s control over works is justified on the basis of her speech interest 
in assuring that her “expression will remain unadulterated”.27 Conversely, from the 
perspective of downstream users, the presence of speech interests in intellectual 
                                                 
21 Grand Upright v. Warner, 780 F. Supp. 182 (S.D.N.Y. 1991)  
22 See EDUARDO MOISÉS PEÑALVER & SONIA K. KATYAL, PROPERTY OUTLAWS: HOW SQUATTERS, PIRATES, 
AND PROTESTERS IMPROVE THE LAW OF OWNERSHIP (Yale University Press. 2010); Julie Cohen, The Place 
of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 351 (2005). 
23 Waldron, supra note 18 at 842. 
24 PALFREY & GASSER, BORN DIGITAL: UNDERSTANDING THE FIRST GENERATION OF DIGITAL NATIVES 137 
(2008). See the Copyright Alliance Education Foundation, http://www.copyrightfoundation.org/. See also, 
Nate Anderson, EFF gives copyright education a crack with new curriculum, Ars Technica, May 28 2008, 
at http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/news/2009/05/eff-gives-copyright-education-a-crack-with-new-
curriculum.ars 
25 Julie Cohen, The Place of the User in Copyright Law, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 347, 351 (2005). 
26  Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985) (“the Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”) David McGowan, Copyright 
Nonconsequentialism, 60 MISSOURI L REV. 1 (2004). 
27 Justin Hughes, The Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L. J. 287, 359 (1988). 
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property’s DNA conditions (or should condition) the reach of the property interest 
(limiting the reach of ex post incentives and the moral desert property paradigm).28  
Some critics of copyright’s expansion concentrate on the output of speech, its 
contribution to a marketplace of ideas and the quality of debate; thus, would value in 
copyright law transformative or “constructive” uses by unauthorized users with priority 
over appropriation, consumptive and non-transformative use.29 Autonomy-based speech 
theories in copyright law, on the other hand, favor individual engagement with cultural 
products as part of processes of self-determination. In this vein, some value personal and 
private experimentation with copyrighted works regardless of expressive output.30   
Others value appropriation as a step to participation in a “semiotic democracy”.31 These 
views are highlighted in the context of digital technologies because the material 
conditions for the production and manipulation of cultural products allow us, more than 
before, to relate with them as active participants of cultural processes that allow personal 
experimentation with cultural elements and not as passive recipients of information 
goods.32 Usual labels associated with these practices include notions of “democratic 
culture”33 or “creative reuse”.34   
                                                 
28 Doctrinally speaking, the Supreme Court has rejected the view that copyright law is “categorically 
immune from challenges under the First Amendment.” Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
29 See e.g. Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) (emphasizing the low speech value of “mak[ing] other’s 
people’s speeches”).  See NEIL NETANEL, COPYRIGHT’S PARADOX (2008). 
30 Rebecca Tushnet, Copy This Essay: How Fair Use Doctrine Harms Free Speech and How Copying 
Serves It, 114 YALE L.J. 535 (2004). 
31 WILLIAM W. FISHER III, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT 
30-31 (Stanford 2004) (“[O]pportunities for creativity of this sort contribute to what has been called 
“semiotic democracy”. Over the course of the twentieth century the power to make cultural meaning in 
most Western countries has become ever more concentrated. . . .  Reversing the concentration of semiotic 
power would benefit us all. People would be more engaged, less alienated, if they had more voice in the 
construction of their cultural environment. And the environment itself . . . would be more variegated and 
stimulating. The new technology makes that possible”). 
32 See Jack Balkin, Digital Speech and Democratic Culture: A Theory of Freedom of Expression for the 
Information Society, 79 NYU L REV. 1, 3-4 (2004) (describing “democratic culture” as “a culture in which 
individuals have a fair opportunity to participate in the forms of meaning making that constitute them as 
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Different parts of copyright doctrine reflect a relative priority between rationales 
while underscoring values within each. The law also prescribes mechanisms to negotiate 
tensions between them, as they are all necessary for sustaining copyright law as a 
paradoxical system of speech-enabling restrictions on speech.  But it does this rather 
haphazardly, rendering a highly indeterminate system. The first copyright statute, the 
Statute of Anne of 1710, was interpreted early on to embody a positive law view of the 
limited monopoly for the benefit of the public as opposed to a perpetual natural law right 
for the exclusive benefit of the copyright owner.35 However, both in England and in the 
United States copyright law was also infused with an author-centric natural law flavor, 
even if mixed with the utilitarian rationale.36  
Through numerous doctrines (such as fair use, substantial similarity,37 the 
                                                                                                                                                 
individuals”); Tushnet, supra at 565; BENKLER, supra. 
33 Balkin, supra. 
34 LESSIG, REMIX (2008). 
35 The first copyright statute was a reaction to the censorial grip that the Crown-controlled Stationer’s 
Company had on publications under the Licensing Act of 1662. L. Ray Patterson and Craig Joyce, 
Copyright in 1791: An essay concerning the Founders' View Of The Copyright Power Granted To 
Congress In Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the US Constitution, 52 EMORY L.J. 909 (2003).  When the 
United States Constitution and the 1790 Copyright Act were enacted, the House of Lords had rejected 
booksellers’ arguments that their underlying rights after the passage of the Statute of Anne were perpetual 
as a consequence of their natural law stature. Donaldson v. Becket, 98 Eng. Rep. 257 (HL 1774). This 
positive law, limited-monopoly, approach was imported to the United States and reiterated early on by the 
Supreme Court. See Wheaton v. Peters, 33 US (8 Pet.) 591 (1834). See LYMAN RAY PATTERSON, 
COPYRIGHT IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 211 (1968); Dianne Leenheer Zimmerman, Information Goods as 
Speech, Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights, 33 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 665, 677-85 (1992).  
36 Diane Zimmerman The Statute of Anne and its Progeny: Variations Without a Theme, Houston Law 
Review, Vol. 47, No. 4. See Preamble of Massachusetts copyright statute of 1783: “Whereas the 
improvement of knowledge, the progress of civilization, … greatly depend on the efforts of ingenious 
persons …; as the principal encouragement such persons can have to make great and beneficial exertions 
of this nature, must exist in the legal security of the fruits of their study and industry to themselves; and as 
such security is one of the natural rights of all men, there being no property more peculiarly a man’s own 
than that which is produced by the labour of his mind…” Cited in PATTERSON,  supra at 187. 
37 Compare  Suntrust Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co., 268 F. 3d 1257 (11 Cir. 2001) (alternate version of 
Gone With The Wind, not substantially similar); Salinger v. Colting, 607F.3d 68 (2d Cir. 2010).  (sequel to 
JS Salinger’s The Catcher in the Rye, substantially similar). 
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idea/expression dichotomy, and the notion of merger38) the law continuously negotiates 
competing claims coming from the standpoints of speech, property and incentives. And it 
is not clear which is necessarily dominant: For example, on one hand, the copyright 
monopoly is directly seen by US courts within the ex ante incentives paradigm, and 
explicitly linked to free speech values.39 But in other cases ex ante incentives and speech 
are of limited reach as Eldred v. Aschroft demonstrates.40 There the Court validated 
(against a first amendment attack) a twenty-year term extension period to existing works 
whose protection was about to expire; even if it cannot plausibly be said that this 
retroactive extension created additional incentives to generate expressive output (since 
the present value of a future revenue stream under the life-plus-seventy year extension is 
low, it negligibly increases an authors’ incentive).41  Statutorily, there are a number of 
instances in which these struggles find their ways. Many user privileges and limits to the 
monopoly are found in the law42 but the trend is clearly toward monopoly 
aggrandizement, closer to the ideal property paradigm of absolute protection and ex post 
                                                 
38 See, e.g., Computer Associates v. Altai, 982 F2d 693 (2d Cir. 1992), emphasized the competing claims in 
that case as follows:   
…amici argue against the type of approach that we have set forth on the grounds that it 
will be a disincentive for future computer program research and development. . . While 
they have a point, their argument cannot carry the day. The interest of the copyright law 
is not in simply conferring a monopoly on industrious persons, but in advancing the 
public welfare through rewarding artistic creativity, in a manner that permits the free use 
and development of non-protectable ideas and processes.  
39  Harper & Row v. Nation Enterprises, 471 US 539, 558 (1985) (“the Framers intended copyright itself to 
be the engine of free expression. By establishing a marketable right to the use of one’s expression, 
copyright supplies the economic incentive to create and disseminate ideas.”) 
40 Eldred,  537 U.S. 186 (2003). 
41 BRIEF OF GEORGE A. AKERLOF, KENNETH J. ARROW, TIMOTHY F. BRESNAHAN, JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 
RONALD H. COASE, LINDA R. COHEN, MILTON FRIEDMAN, JERRY R. GREEN, ROBERT W. HAHN, THOMAS 
W. HAZLETT, C. SCOTT HEMPHILL, ROBERT E. LITAN, ROGER G. NOLL, RICHARD SCHMALENSEE, STEVEN 
SHAVELL, HAL R. VARIAN, AND RICHARD J. ZECKHAUSER AS AMICI CURIAE IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS, 
Eldred v. Achcroft, No. 01-618 May 20, 2002,  
42 See 17 USC § 107-122 
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incentives.43 This uneasy interaction is perhaps best observed in the fair use doctrine, 
which seeks to balance public access interests with those of copyright owners creating a 
highly indeterminate and contextual body of law.44 
Specifying the appropriate relation between these paradigms is beyond this 
paper’s scope. But their allocation will depend to a great extent on the reciprocally-
conditioning effects that paradigms will have on each other (with prevailing values within 
them corresponding to constitutional commitments). This should, in turn, elicit at least 
some rough principles and outer boundaries to evaluate the copyright system.45 In any 
                                                 
43 Both procedurally and substantively, copyright protection has expanded tremendously. Since 1976, many 
of the formal requirements needed to protect a work have been eliminated, moving copyright protection 
farther away from the positive law paradigm.  For example, it is no longer required that a work be 
published as a precondition for protection. Requirements for protection such as notice, deposit, registration 
and term renewal have been eliminated.  Today a work is protected by default since its creation and fixation 
in a tangible medium of expression for an extraordinarily extensive period of time (ordinarily the life of the 
author plus 70 years), instead of the shorter and fragmented periods that predated the 1976 Act. This period 
has been extended several times in the last century delaying the entrance of works into the public domain 
(sometimes even reverting their public domain status and reestablishing their protection).  
Furthermore, copyright protection today is not limited to reproduction rights since it includes, for 
instance, the right to make derivative works (which, in turn, broadly includes translations, musical 
arrangements, dramatization, fictionalization “or any other form in which the work may be recast, 
transformed or adapted”).  As a constitutional matter, while the preambular language of the intellectual 
property clause in the Constitution was stripped from any significant teeth early in the twentieth century, 
the originality requirement has not been an important threshold for copyright limit, as some would have it 
to be.  Additionally, notwithstanding the recent flexibilization of injunctive remedies in intellectual 
property cases, infringement is subject to steep statutory damages, costs and attorney’s fees while the costs 
of litigation to individual users in notoriously prohibitive. 
44 17 USC § 107.  When addressing a fair use claim, courts are required to consider four factors on a case-
by-case basis: (1) the nature and character of the use; (2) the nature of the original work; (3) the portion of 
the original work used; (4) and the effect of the use on the potential market.  Campbell v. Acuff Rose 
Music Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 577 (1994).  
45  In my view, if US copyright law is to be consistent with the First Amendment, then, the demarcation of 
boundaries between speech and incentives should result in a minimalist approach prohibiting only those 
unauthorized uses that have “the likely consequence of largely destroying, not merely reducing, the market 
for authorized copies of the copyrighted material.” Edwin Baker, First Amendment Limits on Copyright, 55 
VAND. L. REV. 891 (2002).  This follows from a liberal reading of current constitutional doctrine that is 
usually wary of state intervention with speech and protects individual autonomy for public discourse 
regardless of its substantive contribution. See Snyder v Phelps, No. 09–751. Argued October 6, 2010—
Decided March 2, 2011 (the first amendment embraces speech of public concern even when it is “certainly 
hurtful and its contribution to public discourse may be negligible”).  Although this view cannot explain all 
First Amendment doctrine, it carries substantial explanatory power.  Robert Post’s participatory theory is 
eloquent in this regard: Only few restrictions on individual communicative activity are allowed—those 
restrictions that can be said to support structures of social cohesion necessary for democratic legitimacy 
through participation in public discourse. ROBERT POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS: DEMOCRACY, 
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case, the point here is that statutory law might reflect a different allocation of copyright 
rationales than what would be constitutionally required and, in those cases, adjustments 
are necessary. Additionally, and returning to our central question, sociotechnical 
arrangements might encode a different constellation of speech, incentives and property, 
which in turn might be subjected to user appropriation and reconstitution. 
B. Copyright Technology 
There is no agreement on a definition of “technology”, its relation to science, 
physical artifacts, goals, social practices, discourses, power or techniques (if one 
definition is possible); and I will not attempt to define it here.46  For the purpose of this 
paper, and adapting Winner’s version,47 I talk about “copyright technologies” when 
referring to tools, instruments, machines, appliances, gadgets—be they physical hardware 
(like ISPs, CPUs, mobile devices, wires, satellites, network routers) or software 
(operating systems, TCP/IP, applications)— which are employed in order to affect the 
use, distribution or reproduction of copyrighted content.  More specifically framed within 
the arguments here made, I refer to those information technologies that have a role to 
play in the accommodation of copyright paradigms. 
                                                                                                                                                 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT (1995). This notion does not seamlessly translate into intellectual property, as 
copyright law embodies structural limits to this approach: because by their very creation rights over 
information goods have built-in limitations to public access to works, State intervention with public 
discourse through copyright is presumed. Thus, Copyright law in the US provides a constitutionally 
permitted ceiling of state-sponsored speech-limiting norms  (provided by the incentives paradigm allowed 
by US Constitution, Art 1, Section 8, Cl. 8, which authorizes Congress “To promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their 
respective Writings and Discoveries”). While liberals dispute the reach of government intervention with 
public discourse, the extent to which the individual autonomy camp can pull in ithe direction of state 
neutrality is limited by the fact of this explicitly-authorized State intervention.  But the First Amendment’s 
commitment to individual autonomy and neutrality exerts pressure and requires this intervention to be as 
minimal as possible; and, hence, a minimalist role for the copyright monopoly (and for the ex ante 
incentives paradigm) is required, given by the gravitational pull of the speech paradigm.  
46 See generally essays at ROBERT C SCHARFF AND VAL DUSEK (EDS), PHILOSOPHY OF TECHNOLOGY: THE 
TECHNOLOGICAL CONDITION, AN ANTHOLOGY 206-43 (2003). 
47 LANGDON WINNER, AUTONOMOUS TECHNOLOGY: TECHNOLOGY OUT OF CONTROL AS A THEME IN 
POLITICAL THOUGHT 11 (1977). 
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Philosophers of technology also include within their conceptions of technology, 
not only artifacts, but also “social practices, social relationships, and systems of 
knowledge”48 since artifacts only have meaning in the context of social interaction. 
Therefore, it is useful to think of copyright technologies as components of socio-
technical systems in order to capture institutions, organization the law and related 
practices49 and to highlight their social dimension as “they affect us not purely by dint of 
physical or material properties but by properties they acquire as systems and devices 
embedded in larger material and social networks and webs of meaning.”50  And this is 
surely the case with copyright technologies: While digital technologies have unleashed 
unprecedented amounts of unauthorized creative uses and expressive activity, 
contemporary socio-technical systems that regulate information goods induce a sort of 
colonization of speech by property and incentives.  
It is well known that digital technologies changed the landscape in which 
copyright law operates. As a response, through DRMs (or Technological Protection 
Measures), content owners are capable of controlling works well beyond legitimate 
claims of copyright by limiting fair uses; affecting—otherwise protected—personal non-
commercial use of content; regulating works in the public domain; or impeding the 
exercise of rights that a user would otherwise have according to the first sale doctrine. In 
some cases, as with the music industry, consumer demand for interoperability and 
flexibility in the use of digital goods has pressured content owners to provide works with 
                                                 
48 Deborah G. Johnson, Computer systems: Moral entities but not moral agents, 8 ETHICS AND 
INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY 195, 197 (2006). 
49 Thomas Hughes, The Evolution of Large Technological Systems 51, in BIJKER, HUGHES, PINCH, THE 
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY 
OF TECHNOLOGY (1989); Thomas Hughes, Technological Momentum 101, in MERRITT ROE SMITH AND LEO 
MARX, DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY?: THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM (1998).  
50 HELEN NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY IN CONTEXT: TECHNOLOGY, POLICY, AND THE INTEGRITY OF SOCIAL LIFE 
6 (2010). 
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less rigorous protection.51  But in other cases, such as the eBook industry, works cannot 
be shared (some books can be lent for up to 14 days, and only once), sold, copied, 
printed, and are unable to interoperate between devices of different vendors.52 In a 
notorious case, purchased eBook copies of Orwell’s 1984 was remotely removed from 
users’ handheld devices by Amazon, for licensing reasons.53 This kind of technological 
self-help is buttressed in current US law by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act 
(DMCA)54 (and elsewhere through the WIPO Copyright Treaty,55 in Europe with the EC 
Information Society Directive56 and in the proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade 
Agreement)57 which prohibit decoding or hacking these technological protections, even 
when the underlying uses would be legitimate and, perhaps, constitutionally protected (to 
the extent the speech paradigm can be said to restrict incentives and property). It is here 
where the “right to hack” is normally invoked, as a reaction to constraining effects of 
technologies embedded into media (eg, CDs, DVDs) or devices people have physical 
access to.  
It should be clear, then, that copyright technologies, as part of socio-technical 
systems, are not value-neutral: they are intimately related to human values.58 Values are 
embodied in information technologies constituting our social experience (creating 
                                                 
51 Hiram A. Meléndez Juarbe, DRM Interoperability, XV B.U. J. SCI. TECH. L 181 (2009). . 
52 Rob Pegoraro, E-book business should take a page from music industry and go DRM-free,  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/e-book-business-should-take-a-page-from-music-industry-and-go-drm-
free/2011/04/05/AFBRbG1C_story.html, April 8, 2011. 
53 Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books From Kindle, July 17, 2009, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html  
54 Digital Millennium Copyright Act of 1998, 17 USC § 1201. 
55 Art. 11, World Intellectual Property Organization Treaty, Dec. 20, 1996 
56 EC Information Society Directive, Directive 2001/29/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 22 May 2001, Article 6 (regarding the protection of “technological measures”). 
57 ACTA Article 27(5) (December 3, 2010 version) available at http://www.wcl.american.edu/pijip/go/acta. 
58 See William W. Lowrence, The Relation of Science and Technology to Human Values, 38 in 
TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN VALUES: ESSENTIAL READINGS (CRAIG HANKS, ED.) (2010). 
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affordances, constraints, enabling practices and discourses);59 but only reciprocally, as we 
mustn’t forget we incorporate values into technologies in the first place.60 Design choices 
(and values behind them) will make possible certain behavior, precluding other 
activities.61 Although in the end, a “technology’s actual use depends on the goals of the 
people interacting with it.”62     
Like many other technologies, copyright technologies are the result of contingent 
processes where social groups give meaning, favor and interpret technologies according 
to historical, cultural and political factors, and relations of power.63 During the course of 
a technology’s history, designs that may seem less desirable get discarded (according to 
normative criteria, such as whether it maximizes IP protection), while other designs are 
accepted. That is, a technology gets “settled” at the expense of discarded designs, 
eventually loosing its “interpretive flexibility”— acquiring a measure of “stabilization”64 
(creating frameworks of meaning that, could generate path dependency in the trajectory 
                                                 
59 Lucas Introna, Towards a post-human intra-actional account of socio-technical agency (and morality), 
Proceedings of the Moral agency and Technical Artefacts scientific workshop NIAS Hague May 2007 
(DRAFT) available at www.nyu.edu/projects/nissenbaum/papers/posthuman.pdf; DONALD NORMAN, THE 
DESIGN OF EVERYDAY THINGS (2002). 
60 See MANUEL CASTELLS, THE RISE OF NETWORK SOCIETY 5 (200, 2ND ED) (“technology does not 
determine society. Nor does society script the course of technological change, …Indeed, the dilemma of 
technological determinism is probably a false problem, since technology is society, and society cannot be 
understood or represented without its technological tools.”) See generally, MERRITT ROE SMITH & LEO 
MARX, EDS., DOES TECHNOLOGY DRIVE HISTORY? THE DILEMMA OF TECHNOLOGICAL DETERMINISM 
(1998). 
61 Flanagan, M., Howe, D. C., & Nissenbaum, H., Embodying Values in Technology: Theory and Practice 
in J. VAN DEN HOVEN & J. WECKERT (EDS.), INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AND MORAL PHILOSOPHY 322 
(2008). 
62 Batya Friedman, Peter H. Kahn, Alan Borning, Value Sensitive Design and Information Systems, in 
DENNIS GALLETTA, PING ZHANG, HUMAN-COMPUTER INTERACTION AND MANAGEMENT INFORMATION 
SYSTEMS: FOUNDATIONS at 361 (2006). 
63 BIJKER, HUGHES, PINCH, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF TECHNOLOGICAL SYSTEMS: NEW DIRECTIONS IN 
THE SOCIOLOGY AND HISTORY OF TECHNOLOGY (1989); WIEBE BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND 
BULBS: TOWARD A THEORY OF SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1997); WIEBE BIJKER & JOHN LAW, EDS., 
SHAPING TECHNOLOGY / BUILDING SOCIETY: STUDIES IN SOCIOTECHNICAL CHANGE (1997). 
64 BIJKER, OF BICYCLES, BAKELITES, AND BULBS, id. at 84-88.  
Meléndez-Juarbe   
 18
of a technology), but that—crucially—could also be subjected to contestation by users or 
disruptive innovations.65   
This “intersection of politics and technology”, the ongoing give and take of social 
value-laden interaction that produces a certain technological ensemble, is what I call 
technopolitics.66 It rejects the sense in which some assume the technological environment 
as overpowering and dystopian and, instead, straightforwardly assumes its political 
potential.  In this sense, “as a technologically mediated form of political engagement and 
action, [technopolitics] is a radical tool potentially available to oppositional, oppressed, 
or excluded social groups and communities”.67  
Hence, Digital Rights Management technologies (or Technological Protection 
Measures) are products of technopolitical dynamics. They carry that name because they 
are normative systems that respond to a particular view on what the relationship between 
copyright paradigms ought to be. The meaning of those technologies has somewhat 
stabilized (with the help of the legal context in which they inhabit, which is in part 
structured by those technologies) and are generally seen by many as absolutely necessary 
preconditions to the existence of intellectual property in a digital environment.68 They 
could alternatively be referred to as “Digital Restrictions Management” or “Digital 
                                                 
65 Id. at 289. For the problems of contingency and stability in the philosophy of science see IAN HACKING, 
THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF WHAT? (1999).  On “disruptive innovations” see CLAYTON CHRISTENSEN, 
THE INNOVATOR’S DILEMMA: WHEN NEW TECHNOLOGIES CAUSE GREAT FIRMS TO FAIL (1997). 
66 Charalambos Tsekeris, Technopolitics, Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology. Ritzer, George (ed). 
Blackwell Publishing, 2007. Blackwell Reference Online (April 2008 Update). 
67 Id. 
68 A leading copyright scholar, for instance, argues that in a digitally connected context “it is difficult to see 
how … authors can maintain the ‘exclusive right’ to their ‘writings’ that the Constitution authorizes 
Congress to secure” if they do not have control over individual access to works (that is, a right to control 
how the work is used and enjoyed). Jane Ginsburg, From Having Copies to Experiencing Works: The 
Development on an Access Right in US Copyright Law, 50 J. COPYRIGHT SOC’Y USA 113, 123 (2003).  
Meléndez-Juarbe   
 19
Restrictions Malware”, but they are not.69  In addition, alternative DRM designs have 
been proposed but ultimately discarded, caught in the crossfire of the “copyright wars”.70  
In a way, we are kind of stuck with DRMs, as products of the political, economic and 
social struggles underlying efforts to define the copyright system.  In this context a “right 
to hack” can be seen as part of an ongoing struggle over the meaning of copyright 
technology and, through technological means, a struggle to define the content of (and 
relationship between) copyright paradigms.   
From a legal-constitutional perspective, in light of the aforementioned DMCA, 
this right to hack is proposed by Julie Cohen as follows: 
[W]here the Constitution imposes limits on the government’s creation of 
and recognition of property rights in intellectual goods, those limits apply 
equally to both legally and technologically delineated property. In some 
instances of overreaching via technological controls, the Constitution may 
even demand a limited self-help right, or “right to hack”, to surmount 
privately erected technological barriers to information that the 
Constitution requires to be publicly accessible.71  
 
In other words, if the constitution (via the speech paradigm) requires that copyright law 
have something like fair uses or a public domain, intellectual property owners cannot 
expect the State to enforce their interests beyond their entitlement by enjoining 
individuals from breaking overreaching technological measures.72  An individual “right 
                                                 
69 See Richard Stallman, Some Confusing or Loaded Words and Phrases that are Worth Avoiding, 
http://www.gnu.org/philosophy/words-to-avoid.html#DigitalRightsManagement (last visited Feb. 1, 2009). 
70 See Barbara L. Fox & Brian A. LaMacchia, Encouraging Recognition of Fair Uses in DRM Systems, 
COMMC’NS OF THE ACM, Apr. 2003, at 61; Dan Burk & Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights 
Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41, 57 (2001);  Timothy K. Armstrong, Digital Rights 
Management and the Process of Fair Use, 20 HARV. J.L. & TECH 49, 82 (2006). On the copyright wars see 
WILLIAM PATRY, MORAL PANICS AND THE COPYRIGHT WARS (2009). 
71 Dan Burk & Julie Cohen, Fair Use Infrastructure for Rights Management Systems, 15 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH. 41, 52 (2001) 
72 Burk & Cohen, supra at 53-54: “The use of technology to block public access to public domain elements 
of managed content and/or to block fair uses of such content is equivalent to the unauthorized fencing of 
public lands”. 
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to hack” comes then as an affirmative self-help effort to recalibrate aspects of a 
technologically-misaligned copyright system.73  
To be sure, the argument is attractive as it implicitly suggests a notion of 
“technological democratization” that requires “expanded opportunities for people … to 
participate effectively in guiding the evolving technological order”74 that helps structure 
our social reality; particularly with regard to technology affecting contexts for freedom of 
expression. However, it faces a number of barriers that prevent it from fully materializing 
in the law. Namely, (1) the public/private divide, (2) indeterminacy and (3) practical 
limitations given contemporary forms of enforcing copyright.  
 First, a lot hinges on the particular incarnation of the liberal public/private divide 
by deciding what constitutes state action (subject to the trumping effects of the right to 
hack) and what activity is attributable to private actors. Whatever criteria we use to make 
this allocation will be controversial.75 But, as with other property rights in general,76 US 
courts have held that even when intellectual property rights are “created by some 
governmental act … [t]he actions of the …owners nevertheless remain private.”77 Maybe 
the public imprint of state action is easier to grasp in light of a special law like the 
DMCA that makes illegal the particular act of “circumvention” of overreaching DRM 
                                                 
73 See generally, Jennifer Chandler, Technological Self-Help and Equality in Cyberspace, 56 MCGILL L. J. 
39 (2011). 
74 See Richard Sclove, The Nuts and Bolts of Democracy: Democratic Theory and Technological Design, in 
DEMOCRACY IN A TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 139 (L. Winner, Ed. 1992). 
75 See eg Paul Brest, State Action and Liberal Theory: A Case Note on Flagg Brothers v. Brooks, 130 U PA 
L. REV. 1296 (1982); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 
POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, Vol. 38, No. 3 (Sep., 1923), pp. 470-494. See also Duncan Kennedy, The 
Stages of the Decline of the Public/Private distinction, 130 U. PENN. L. REV. 1349 (1982). 
76 “It would intolerably broaden… the notion of state action … … to hold that the mere existence of a body 
of property law in a State…itself amount to “state action” even though no state process or state officials 
were ever involved in enforcing that body of law”, Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 160 n. 10 
(1978). 
77 S.F. Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. USOC, 483 US 522, 544 (1987). See also Wheaton v Peters, 33 U. S. 591, 
685 (1834) (“Congress, … instead of sanctioning an existing right, as contended for, created it. This seems 
to be the clear import of the law, connected with the circumstances under which it was enacted.”)  
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without regard to (and beyond any claim to) underlying intellectual property rights.78  But 
assuming a world without that law reveals another layer of the same problem since many 
courts relegate overreaching activity to the private realm of contract law. Because 
DRMed works come bundled with so called shrink-wrap licenses (essentially adhesion 
contracts) courts regularly enforce these contract-supported DRMs under the paradigm of 
an autonomous sphere of private transactions (even when overreaching beyond IP 
rights).79 In such cases, no constitutional “right to hack” seems applicable, as courts are 
unwilling to muddle the liberal public/private divide. In short, at least in the United 
States, this seems to be a formidable barrier to recognizing such right.  
The second problem regards difficulties with specifying the content of this right; 
that is, to hack what and for what purpose? We can see the issue from the perspective of 
two potential right-bearers: the designer of hacking technology and the user of that 
technology. They might be the same person, but often they are not.  
From the designer’s perspective we would have to ask if laws that burden that 
individual’s design choices come within the purview of free speech. In that case we 
would have to consider whether computer code writing deserves constitutional attention, 
a cumbersome issue that is part of a larger debate about what counts as “speech”.80 
                                                 
78 See Julie Cohen, A Right to Read Anonymously: A Closer Look at “Copyright Management” in 
Cyberspace, 28 CONN. L. REV. 981, 1024 (1996) (“[T]he civil remedies … are not remedies for copyright 
infringement, but separate civil penalties tied to the act of “tampering” itself.”) 
79 See ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); 5 WILLIAM PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT 
§ 18:26 (and cases cited).  
80 On the problem of what counts as speech, see generally, Frederick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First 
Amendment: A Preliminary Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 1117 HARV. L. REV. 1765 (2004). On 
the issue of whether code is speech, see, Bernstein v. United States, 176 F.3d 1132 (9th Cir. 1999) (vacated, 
rehearing granted 192 F.3d 1308 (9th Cir 1999) (because “cryptographers use source code to express their 
scientific ideas in much the same way that mathematicians use equations or economics use graphs…we 
conclude that encryption software, in its source code form and as employed by those in the field of 
cryptography, must be viewed as expressive for First Amendment purposes”); Universal City Studios v. 
Reimerdes, 111 F.Supp.2d 294 (SDNY 2000) (“All modes by which ideas may be expressed or, perhaps, 
emotions evoked-including speech, books, movies, art, and music-are within the area of First Amendment 
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Assuming it does, what follows? Not all speech acts are covered by freedom of speech 
values nor protected by the constitution. When they are, it often means that someone 
absorbs a cost of some kind, which we tolerate. In NY Times v. Sullivan,81 for example, 
the US Supreme Court established a sort of safe harbor for news publishers against 
libelous and defamatory actions in public discourse.82  In these cases, the “defamed must 
subsidize speakers, by allowing their reputations to be compromised to the end of broad 
diversity”.83  Similarly, a designer’s right to develop hacking technology would also 
impose on copyright owners the obligation to subsidize the technology. The analogy 
might work if the defamed is similarly situated to the copyright owner, which would be a 
controversial proposition because, among other reasons, copyright owner’s interests are 
uniquely delimited by the paradigm trio in ways that the interests of the defamed might 
not be.84 But, most importantly, the analogy works only if the particular practice in 
question (designing circumventing technology) is connected to values like those 
supporting the subsidy in the defamation example (be it individual autonomy, collective 
                                                                                                                                                 
concern. As computer code-whether source or object-is a means of expressing ideas, the First Amendment 
must be considered before its dissemination may be prohibited or regulated. In that sense, computer code is 
covered or, as sometimes is said, “protected” by the First Amendment”); Lee Tien, Publishing Software as 
a Speech Act, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J 629 (2000). 
81 376 US 254 (1964). 
82 Even if a public figure is defamed, the publisher of the statement (regardless of whether the statement is 
by another person) is not liable unless she knew that it was false or acted in reckless disregard of its truth or 
falsity. Erroneous and defamatory statements are tolerated “if the freedoms of expression are to have the 
‘breathing space’ they need to survive”. 
83 Cass Sunstein, Free Speech Now, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 255, 304 (1992). 
84 AIt is also difficult to compare the newspaper with the technology designer. The relationship between the 
technology designer and the technology user is usually different than the relationship between the 
newspaper and the individual speaker in the paper.  It is not clear to what extent one could compare the 
speakers within a non-digital newspaper (whose actions are attributed to the newspaper by law), on one 
hand, and users of a circumvention technology, on the other, whose actions are not generally attributed to 
the designer (at least when dealing with untethered technologies or services (see eg, Sony v. Universal, 464 
U.S. 417 (1984) where no liability against VCR developer for user’s potentially infringing activity;  but cf. 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), liability attached to developer of a networked 
system that is part of an ongoing relationship between user and developer). Finally, the Sullivan standard 
applies with force to public figures, which is not necessarily applicable to copyright use (especially 
personal, private, use). 
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self determination, or a participatory theory, for example). Otherwise we wouldn’t be 
able to distinguish between writing code for a virus worm and code to make possible fair 
uses.   
Similarly, from a user’s perspective, a right to hack would need to explain why a 
user should access the content in the specific format she wants.  Assuming a DRM 
prevents access to the content in digital format a user could always access works through 
the naturally given “analog hole”.85 In this sense, there are always alternative means to 
access content despite DRMs, although at a lower quality. A US court once saw it this 
way: 
We know of no authority for the proposition that fair use . . . much less the 
Constitution, guarantees copying by the optimum method or in the 
identical format of the original. . . . [T]he DMCA does not impose even an 
arguable limitation on the opportunity to make a variety of traditional fair 
uses of DVD movies, such as commenting on their content, quoting 
excerpts from their screenplays, and even recording portions of the video 
images and sounds on film or tape by pointing a camera, a camcorder, or 
a microphone at a monitor as it displays the DVD movie. The fact that the 
resulting copy will not be as perfect or as manipulable as a digital copy 
obtained by having direct access to the DVD movie in its digital form, 
provides no basis for a claim of unconstitutional limitation of fair use. . . . 
Fair use has never been held to be a guarantee of access to copyrighted 
material in order to copy it by the fair user’s preferred technique or in the 
format of the original.86 
 
                                                 
85 The “analog hole” concept describes the fact that digital content must be presented to users in an analog 
form (like observing a TV screen with the naked eye) since humans do not perceive images and sounds 
digitally. Patrick Wolf, Complementing DRM with Digital Watermarking: mark, search, retrieve, 31 
ONLINE INFO. REV. 10, 11 (2007).   See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Analog_hole (“The analog hole 
(also known as the analog loophole) is a fundamental and inevitable vulnerability in copy protection 
schemes for noninteractive works in digital formats which can be exploited to duplicate copy-protected 
works that are ultimately reproduced using analog means. Once digital information is converted to a 
human-perceptible (analog) form, it is a relatively simple matter to digitally recapture that analog 
reproduction in an unrestricted form, thereby fundamentally circumventing any and all restrictions placed 
on copyrighted digitally-distributed work. Media publishers who use digital rights management (DRM), to 
restrict how a work can be used, perceive the necessity to make it visible and/or audible as a "hole" in the 
control that DRM otherwise affords them.”) 
86 Universal Studios v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 459 (2d Cir. 2001). 
Meléndez-Juarbe   
 24
Dismissing the claim as being simply about wanting access to “a preferred 
technique or in the format of the original” suffers from the perennial levels-of-generality 
problem in constitutional interpretation.87  But this only unmasks as simplistic argument 
that makes the “right to hack” just about accessing a “particular format” and says nothing 
about free speech values that a constitution embodies and, on the other hand, how does 
the technology (or format to which access is sought) relates to pursuing those values.   
It might be that the best way to approach these question is to contextually 
consider the technology’s connection to political values behind freedom of speech88 and, 
in the copyright context, how that speech paradigm conditions and limits incentive and 
property.  There is nothing particularly special about paper or asphalt. But a law banning 
leafleting on the streets infringes the First Amendment because distributing information 
in public is a social practice so closely associated to free speech values that its prohibition 
is an assault on freedom of expression.89  In this sense, when we say that leafleting is a 
“medium of expression” with constitutional significance, it is another way of saying that 
it is a “form of interaction that realizes First Amendment values.”90  Thus, when a law 
forecloses “an entire medium of expression” so that it eliminates “a common means of 
speaking, such measures can suppress too much speech” (even if the law is neutral as to 
                                                 
87 LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE CONSTITUTION (Harvard 1991).  
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90 Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 713, 716 
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content or viewpoint).91 As suggested by Post, then, “First Amendment 
coverage…depends upon how the object of regulation is integrated into First Amendment 
media”.92  If, in his example, music is a medium of expression, and the government were 
to ban all CD players, “prohibiting CD players would materially disrupt the pattern of 
social relationships that comprise the contemporary medium of music”93 and, thus, at a 
minimum would come within the ambit of the First Amendment. This reasoning would 
apply to “right to hack” claims by both the designer of the technology and its user.  And 
to consider the effects of DRMs and anti-circumvention laws on speech interests, 
empirical questions would seem unavoidable as we would have to evaluate how the DRM 
restrictions on the design of particular technology (circumvention technology) or its use 
(to access a particular format by a user) affects expressive social practice as understood 
by privileged speech values.94  A highly indeterminate task, to be sure. For one thing is to 
prohibit CD players generally (or printers, radios or TVs) that have primarily 
communicative uses, and another, more dynamic, is to prohibit technology that interferes 
with the murky and contextually specified triad of copyright paradigms. Again, here the 
right to hack faces great challenges.  
A third, and I think more important limitation, is practical. Once we consider how 
the expressive environment gets regulated via socio-technical systems beyond the reach 
of any plausible right to hack, we begin to seriously doubt its practical significance.   
For the expressive environment is pervasively regulated many steps removed 
                                                 
91 City of Laudue v. Gilleo, 512 US 43 (1994) (regarding the prohibition on residential signs in order to 
minimize visual clutter).  
92 Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 713, 717 
(2000).  
93 Id. at 722. 
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from the media and devices where DRMs come in contact with users.  Copyright 
enforcement increasingly depends on targeting, not potential infringers and things in their 
possession, but intermediaries that stand between users and copyright owners.  In the 
process, a combination of law and technology creates opportunities for over-protection of 
copyright interests, readjusting the relationship between copyright paradigms eclipsing 
speech under property and incentives.  It is precisely through intermediaries that the 
regulation of distributed online behavior is possible, like the examples of China, Egypt, 
Burma and many other countries show.95 But we don’t need to go to extremes to see this 
point: regulation increasingly targets transport intermediaries like internet service 
providers (ISPs), information intermediaries such as search engines, financial 
intermediaries like credit card companies and PayPal,96 among others.97 Thus, for 
example, when the government wants to reduce individual use of sexually explicit 
material, its does so through the regulation of devices and software that stand between 
the user and that content (requiring filters in computer terminals at public libraries).98  
This is not a feature exclusive to current digital milieu. Regulation through 
                                                 
95 See Open Net Initiative, http://opennet.net/ 
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proxies is a common regulatory strategy, especially with regard to speech.99 And in the 
copyright context, the strategy also predates digital technologies. Initially, for example, 
copyright law in the US was not concerned with securing owners the right to charge for 
personal noncommercial use of content (such as personal copying and reproduction of 
passages from a book, or music).  It would have been too costly.  As personal copying 
became easier and cheaper thanks to the availability of copy technologies, personal 
activities were encompassed within owners’ rights.100 The law, then, focused on those 
copy-facilitating technologies and on the increased amount of personal and potentially 
lucrative uses they allowed.101  Initially, technologies themselves were not generally 
targeted,102 at least for a while.103 Eventually, enforcement strategies in the twentieth 
century shifted from attempting to catch potentially infringing users to commandeering 
technology design.104 These dynamics get amplified in a digitally networked context. As 
individual online behavior is intermediated through highly vulnerable actors, they 
become crucial for any enforcement strategy; creating new articulations of the 
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Eds. 2006). 
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Meléndez-Juarbe   
 28
relationship between copyright rationales. 
As far as I can see there are several major interrelated intermediary regimes in 
current law and practice. 
(1) Secondary liability rules as they apply to tethered devices with which users 
experience digital works and other online services (such as peer-to-peer filesharing 
systems or services in the “cloud”).105 Exposing intermediaries (or gatekeepers) to 
liability in order to enlist their help in enforcing normative commitments is a common 
strategy employed in many legal contexts. In general, these regimes develop in situations 
either where imposing liability on someone directly would not adequately deter 
misconduct or where it’s costly to do so.106   According to prevailing legal standards107 
these intermediaries are required to employ technological measures that are reasonable in 
terms of a risk-utility balance.108 But experience shows a degree of overenforcement: to 
the extent that gatekeepers and users have divergent interests, when selecting gatekeeping 
technology an intermediary will not necessarily take into account the full value of all the 
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uses that the end-user would and will rationally select a technology that maximizes its 
wellbeing; that is, a technology that reduces its expected liability costs.109  
(2) Statutory safe harbors that condition an intermediary’s immunity from 
secondary liability upon its compliance with certain requirements. These include (a) 
immediately taking down allegedly infringing material upon service of notice, (b) 
implementing a policy for terminating the service to their clients that are “repeat 
infringers” and (c) incorporating filtering technologies.110  Currently, services like 
Youtube and Google, for example, are harbored under US law only if, among other 
things, they expeditiously reply to content owner’s requests to remove allegedly 
infringing material from their servers or search results.111  The effect of this legal regime 
has been largely to induce overenforcement by service providers for fear of losing legal 
immunity.112 One study found that 30% of take down notices are essentially 
copyfrauds,113 that is, based on weak legal claims, and that very few people take 
advantage of a counter-notice procedure.114 Furthermore, copyright owners regularly 
send take-down notices to intermediaries about participants in file-sharing networks even 
if they do not share or download any content at all.115  Chile116 and Ecuador117 have 
enacted similar intermediary enforcement mechanisms.  
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(3) Private gatekeeping agreements between copyright owners and Internet 
Service Providers (ISP’s). ISPs routinely incorporate a host of filtering technologies –
with notorious problems of over and underinclusiveness—examining data traffic or 
monitoring content itself to identify copyrighted content by analyzing its features such as 
its metadata, digital watermarks or their actual characteristics.118  
(4) Three-strike laws. Mechanisms where the intermediary is required to 
disconnected internet service after detecting repeated instances of infringement. 
Countries such as Taiwan, France and New Zealand have adopted legislation that would 
require ISP’s to cut off internet access of allegedly infringing users, after a number of 
instances.119 In Mexico, three-strikes legislation was proposed yet failed for lack of 
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support;120 and a proposal in Colombia was announced a few months ago.121 
 In all these cases, enforcement of copyright law operates through technological 
systems that stand distant from the users’ reach, and hence immune from any claim to 
hack technological protection measures. In all of them, there is a real risk of curtailing 
expressive activity, against which a right to hack would be powerless. And together with 
these indirect enforcement strategies we see a “strong moralization of the debate”122 
through educational campaigns about the wrongness of piracy and, thus, the 
strengthening of property and incentives in a competitive struggle against claims for 
broader uses. 
II.  Technopolitics 
 A copyright system, then, reflects struggles to regularize and stabilize the 
relationship between competing dominant rationales of incentives, copyright and speech.  
Copyright law, doctrinally, reflects these tensions; but we also see them play out in 
copyright technology, as it interacts with the legal system.  In the process we experience 
technopolitics as “politics pursued by technological means”,123 of which a potential “right 
to hack” is just a speckle. And in this process, we not only see the embodiment of values 
in technologies but also, the shaping of the legal context into which these technologies 
are projected.124  
The trends here examined point to complex technological systems where a “right 
to hack” seems almost out of place. Whether we can jailbreak devices might be 
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important, but relatively inconsequential. Our technopolitics, then, might have to put on 
hold the emphasis on individual rights to focus more on technological arrangements that 
help structure the incentives/speech/property environment.  It might be that –as Balkin 
argues for the United States context—free speech doctrine is ill-equipped to address 
pressing problems of a networked information economy and is, thus, becoming 
“increasingly irrelevant to the free speech battles of the future”.125  Instead, as he argues, 
“the most important decisions affecting the future of freedom of speech . . . will be 
decisions about technological design, legislative and administrative regulation, the 
formation of new business models and the collective activities of end-users.”126  
At the same time, by thinking beyond individual rights and focusing more on the 
expressive context we see more clearly the moral relevance of information technologies. 
In the end “to balance our accounts of society, we … have to turn our exclusive attention 
away from humans and look also at nonhumans” 127 and see that when we delegate into 
technologies certain actions with normative content, these technologies sometimes 
feedback into humans specific prescriptions (that is, “the moral and ethical dimension of 
mechanisms”).128  So, with Latour, we must “follow the path that leads from text to 
things and from things to texts”.129  But accepting this reciprocal relation does not mean 
we must ignore that we, human architects, make crucial design choices and that we 
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should critically evaluate those choices. In technopolitics, the moment we go from “text 
to things” is fundamental.130 
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